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A Seven (or so) Year Hitch: How Has The Coalition’s Pledge To 
Restore The Right To Non-Violent Protest Fared? 
 
 
In the course of the 2010 election campaign, the Liberal Democrats 
committed themselves to “restore the right to protest by reforming the 
Public Order Act to safeguard non-violent protest even if it offends; and 
restrict the scope of injunctions issued by vested interests.”1  This led, 
after the formation of the Coalition government in May 2010, to a pledge 
to “restore rights to non-violent protest”.2 Nearly a decade on, it is time to 
assess how far that was brought into effect. This article takes a broad 
sweep across the past eight years, looking at peaceful protest and 
political participation. It concludes that, with some honourable exceptions, 
the trend has been a regressive one or at least not a liberalising one. That 
is probably unsurprising. While there have been some advances at 
doctrinal level, the practical reality on the streets for those wishing to 
express their dissent or bring about political/social change is one marked 
by increasing difficulty. The article is in two main parts. The first, shorter 
part plots some of the key events in the period. The second is organised 
around four themes, each illustrating a tension or an area of interplay 
between protesters and the state 3 : doctrinal developments; policing 
practice; non-state – that is private – involvement and regulation; and 
access to civic space.4 
																																																								
1 Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 p. 93 
2 The Coalition: Our Programme for Government p.11 available here	
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-coalition-documentation (access on 19 December 2017).   
3 It is by no means a compendious or encyclopaedic account, but one that is selective and illustrative of the 
eight-year period in its entirety. 
4 It takes no account of changes to the law regulating industrial protests such as the Trade Union Act 2016. 
  
 
1. EVENTS 2010 - 2017  
 
The coming into being of the Coalition in 2010 was a response to what 
was perceived as the financial mishandling of the British economy by 
Gordon Brown, first as Chancellor for ten years and then, from 2007, as 
Prime Minister, dealing with the global crash in 2008. The terrain of the 
2010 election campaign was fiscal responsibility and deficit reduction, the 
difference between the two main parties was largely the speed of 
reduction, and thus how far the reins on the public finances needed 
tightening. 
 
Thus both the Coalition’s raison d’être and its modus operandi were the 
very things likely to generate hostility and opposition – from those at the 
sharp end of the benefit cuts implied by its austerity package to those 
fearful of ideological attacks more widely on public sector provision. 5 
Indeed, empirical research undertaken by David Bailey “suggests that 
2015 actually had the highest level of visible dissent in the UK since 
before the 1980s.”6 This came about very quickly after the formation of 
the Coalition. Student demonstrations in late 2010 (at the time of 																																																								
5 We might simply note in passing the increased propensity to litigate the legality – generally in human 
rights terms – of the changes introduced to the welfare system: see e.g. R (oao Carmichael) v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58. 
6 D Bailey “Hard Evidence: this is the Age of Dissent – and there’s much more to come” The Conversation 11 
January 2016 https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-this-is-the-age-of-dissent-and-theres-much-
more-to-come-52871 (access on 19 December 2017),  building on D Bailey “Contending the crisis: What role 
for extra-parliamentary British politics?” (2014) 9 British Politics 68. 
parliamentary debates on trebling student fees, against which the 
LibDems had been campaigning not six months before) and mass TUC-led 
marches and rallies in early 2011, ran alongside the start of more direct 
forms of action, such as UK Uncut (highlighting tax avoidance by 
companies such as Vodaphone) at a time when we “were all in it 
together”,7 and the Occupy movement. A few months later, the wedding of 
Prince William and Kate Middleton prompted protests, in part at the cost 
to the public purse in such times, as did, in 2013 (and for other reasons of 
course), the death of Margaret Thatcher where several hundred turned 
their backs as the funeral cortege made its way along the Embankment.  
 
It is not just fiscal policy that generated such turbulence, either here or 
abroad. There have been large-scale demonstrations – both for and 
against – Scottish independence, during the referendum campaign in 
2014, as well as more recently and (perhaps) more divisively across the 
UK during the Brexit referendum, and in its aftermath. The election of 
Donald Trump as 45th President of the US in November 2016 – given 
some of his comments during the campaign – led to widespread protests 
across the world, concerned about what this said about the treatment of 
women. An estimated 100,000 marched in central London on his first day 
in office, in January 2017, as well as in other UK cities such as Belfast, 
Cardiff, Edinburgh, Lancaster, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester and Bristol.8 In 
																																																								
7 Emblazoned on p.vi of the Conservative’s 2010 manifesto: “Invitation to join the Government of Britain”. 
8 A march of 100,000 announced by UKIP leader Nigel Farage in London, planned for the day the Supreme 
Court was due to hand down judgment in Miller in December 2016 was cancelled for fear of hijacking by 
right wing extremists: J Watts, “Nigel Farage's Brexit march on Supreme Court cancelled amid claims it 
might be hijacked by far right groups” The Independent 25 November 2016 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-brexit-march-cancelled-supreme-court-far-
right-article-50-a7439246.html (access on 19 December 2017).   
the summer of 2016, to mark five years after the shooting of Mark 
Duggan in Tottenham (and the UK-wide riots that ensued, prompted in part 
by an escalated response by the police to a protest by his family outside 
the local police station), the group Black Lives Matter held sit down road 
protests, blocking access to both Heathrow and Birmingham airports to 
signify the “everyday constant disruption” in the lives of black people9, and 
also to bring attention to the use of the airports for deportation. In late 
2017, came the #MeToo movement. This was prompted initially by the 
making public of allegations of sexual assaults and harassment in 
Hollywood, but within a few weeks had grown to a global campaign 
encompass sexual harassment at work more widely, and more widely the 
treatment of women. It has generally been a social media, viral campaign 
with thousands using the #MeToo to bear witness, and voice their 
opposition, and this has very much been the case in the UK, though it has 
taken a more physical form too as this march in Bristol shows.10  
 
Our concern should not simply be staged large-scale protest events. For 
too long, the focus of policy makers and academics has been on such. I 
have written about this elsewhere, but protest as socio-political activity 
																																																								
9  BBC News “Black Lives Matter protests stop cars and trams across England”, 5 August 2016 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-36983852 (access on 19 December 2017).  Those 
at Heathrow  were found guilty of wilfully obstructing the highway (s.137 Highways Act 1980) but given 
conditional discharges: Press Association “Nine Black Lives Matter protesters guilty over Heathrow 
disruption” The Guardian 19 January 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/19/nine-black-
lives-matter-protesters-guilty-over-heathrow-disruption (access on 19 December 2017) and Press 
Association “Heathrow runway activists face no penalty over motorway protest” The Guardian 16 December 
2016 (access on 19 December 2017) 
  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/22/heathrow-runway-activists-face-no-penalty-over-
motorway-protest 
10  Bristol Evening Post “#MeToo Protesters block traffic in Bristol city centre”, 27 October 2017, 
http://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/gallery/metoo-protesters-block-traffic-bristol-693792 
(access on 10 January 2018). 
requires an appreciation and comprehension of the small-scale and 
everyday, a reclaiming of protest from below, to paraphrase EP 
Thompson. The eight-year period has of course been full of such minor 
acts of dissent11, which by their very nature registered with only a handful 
of observers. Those that had a wider reach would include a man who 
‘shoplifted’ a kindle (and handed himself in to the police) in protest at the 
‘appalling behaviour’ of its online customer service team12, tree protesters 
in Sheffield 13 , disability activists planning to block the concourse at 
London Bridge in rush hour in protest at reduced accessibility14, and, my 
favourite, 77 year-old John Fuller who organised a round-the-clock protest 
at the failure to bypass his Dorset village by repeatedly pressing the 
button on a pedestrian crossing, leaving the lights almost constantly on 
red!15 
 
 
2. HOW HAVE PROTESTERS AND ACTIVISTS FARED 
SINCE 2010? 
 
																																																								
11 I am drawing here on Mark Thomas’s “100 Acts of Minor Dissent”, from May 2013 to May 2014, 
culminating in a live five-hour stage show: http://www.markthomasinfo.co.uk/about/100-acts-of-minor-
dissent/ 
12 “Tonbridge man 'shoplifts' from store in protest of 'big business'” Kent and Sussex Courier 27 February 
2015.  
13 Sheffield City Council v Fairhall and Others [2017] EWHC 2121 QB. 
14 D. Taylor ‘Disability campaigners plan rush-hour protest at London Bridge station’ The Guardian 5 April 
2017  https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/apr/05/disability-campaigners-plan-rush-hour-protest-
at-london-bridge-station access on 10 January 2018. 
15 S Morris “Anti-lorries protest brings traffic to halt at touch of a button” The Guardian 4 May 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/may/04/lorries-protest-pedestrian-crossing (access on 19 
December 2017). 
In this main section, we assess how far the right of peaceful protest has 
been advanced and secured during the eight years since the 
Conservative/LibDem coalition took power. The picture painted is not an 
especially healthy one for more activist and transgressive protests, once 
we move away from the protection offered to the large-scale, formulaic 
protest: the placard-waving march or demonstration. The section is in four 
parts: developments at doctrinal level, whether that be legislative change 
or judicial decisions; operational policing practice; the involvement of and 
regulation by private law and private actors; and access to civic space, in 
both its literal and figurative sense. This article offers two different 
conceptualisations of protest: a narrower one, protest as (collective) event 
and, when we consider interruptive surveillance, political campaigning and 
access to space, a wider one, protest as process.16 That latter envisages 
the precursor organisational aspects – and thus provides us with a link 
between law and social movement theory.  
 
 
Doctrinal developments 
 
At the level of the formal legal rules, here there has been positive change. 
One of the Coalition’s early moves, in October 2011, was a consultation 
on police powers to promote and maintain public order. One element was 
on the removal of the word “insulting” from s.5 of the Public Order Act 
1986 (POA), leaving the crime as using threatening or abusive words or 																																																								
16 On which see generally V Aston “State surveillance of protest and the rights to privacy and freedom of 
assembly: a comparison of judicial and protester perspectives” (2017) 8(1) European Journal of Law and 
Technology 14.	
behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress.17 During the course of what became s.57 
of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, an amendment was moved in the 
House of Lords to achieve that result. This was initially resisted by the 
Government but in the Commons 2nd Reading debate the Home Secretary 
said that whilst the Government supported the retention of s.5 as currently 
worded, it was “not minded” to challenge the amendment in the light of 
assurances from the DPP.18 The change came into effect on 1 February 
2014.  
 
This is clearly a liberalising measure. The textbooks and law courts are 
full of esoteric examples of insulting behaviour charges being used to limit 
political and dissentient speech, cases such as Hammond v DPP19 and 
Norwood v DPP. 20  The Commons library noted the charges brought 
against a teenage anti-Scientology protestor and the well-publicised case 
of a student arrested for calling a police horse “gay”, although in both 
cases, the charges were later dropped. In 2012, police in Lincolnshire 
threatened to arrest an atheist who displayed a poster in a window saying, 
all “religions are fairy stories”.21 Going further back, s.5 was relied on to 
prosecute anti-abortion protesters who insulted a police officer with their 
																																																								
17 On s.5 generally see A Geddis “Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace – ‘insulting’ 
expression and section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986” [2004] PL 853. The LibDem pledge, recall, coming 
into the 2015 Election was to safeguard “offensive” non-violent protest, not something covered by s.5. 
18 “’Insulting words or behaviour’: Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986” House of Commons Library 
Research Briefing 15 January 2013, available here 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05760 (access on 19 December 
2017). 
19 [2004] EWHC 69 Admin. 
20 [2003] EWHC 1564 Admin. 
21 “Christian Institute criticises police over atheist’s poster” The Christian Institute 22 June 2012, 
http://www.christian.org.uk/news/christian-institute-criticises-police-over-atheists-poster/ 
placards displaying aborted foetuses 22 , or those in Northern Ireland 
arrested for displaying a poster “Ireland: Twenty Years of Resistance” 
featuring four youths stoning an armoured car.23  
 
A fair conclusion could be that these types of cases should, if not 
disappear, at least reduce considerably in number and frequency. “Insult” 
was used as a catch-all, not something as easily open to police with the 
word “threaten”. How far the word “abuse” might fill that discretionary 
policing gap is questionable. Data will reveal little, indicating simply that 
s.5 has been used, not which of the three, now two, verbs was in play. 
That said, the change might not have such a profound affect. The residual 
common law power to arrest or warn to desist on grounds that continued 
behaviour would constitute breach of the peace remains. While there is 
arrest data, it is impossible to know the scale of the problem when police 
‘merely’ warn. We will never be able to tell if there had genuinely been a 
decrease in the police power to regulate dissent and protest, or simply a 
diversion. What those reports of the historic (and possibly continued) 
reliance on s.5 by the police tell us is the oftentimes chasm between law 
and practice. I have written elsewhere about possible ways that the 
seeming severity of s.5 in the context of political expression might be 
tempered.24 The first is through reading the “reasonable conduct” defence 
in s.5 as always permitting the proportionate exercise of free speech 
rights under Article 10. The second, and not dissimilar route, was achieved 
																																																								
22 DPP v Clarke (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 359 DC. 
23 Cited in C Gearty and K Ewing Freedom under Thatcher (OUP, 1990) 122. 
24 D Mead The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era (Hart, 2010) 
223 et seq. 
in Percy v DPP.25 There, the conviction by magistrates of a long-term 
peace campaigner, who placed the US stars and stripes flag on which 
she’d written ‘No To Star Wars”, on the road outside a USAF airbase, was 
overturned by the Divisional Court. Technically, this was not a revisiting of 
s.5 considered “anew through the prism of section 3” of the HRA.26 Yet, it 
is sound evidence of the importance placed by (certain) courts on Article 
10 in the context of protest. Such instances as the Lincolnshire poster or 
the reports that the Met were willing to utilise it against those protesting at 
the funeral of Margaret Thatcher in 2013 continue to show the difficulties 
of doctrinal development and case-law change percolating into 
operational policing. 
 
The second legislative development which superficially sustains the claim 
that that 2010 pledge has been met, or at least that steps had been 
taken towards achieving it, was to the law that governed demonstrations 
in and around Westminster. The outright ban on unauthorised 
demonstrations had been the subject of contention since its introduction in 
2005 in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act of that year. It was 
repealed by s.141 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
(PRSA) 2011. However, this did not mean reversion to the status quo ante. 
Protests around Westminster were not going to be regulated on the same 
basis as elsewhere in England and Wales under the general provisions in 
ss.12-14A of the POA 1986. Instead, the PRSA 2011 introduced a power 
																																																								
25 [2001] EWHC 1125 Admin 
26 Mead n24, 225 
to control certain but varied activities in Parliament Square.27 First, this 
covers a much smaller area than under the 2005 scheme, which was 
about 1.25km by 1.75km.28 Secondly, and to reiterate, the PRSA no longer 
effected an outright ban on unauthorised “demonstrations”, howsoever 
they might be defined. Nonetheless, while the activities were not facially 
directed at or limited to protesting activities, s.143(2) of the PRSA defines 
what is proscribed: operating any amplified noise equipment; erecting or 
keeping erected in the controlled area any tent, or any other structure that 
is designed, or adapted, (solely or mainly) for the purpose of facilitating 
sleeping or staying in a place for any period; using any tent or other such 
structure in the controlled area for the purpose of sleeping or staying in 
that area; placing or keeping in place in the controlled area any sleeping 
equipment with a view to its use  for the purpose of sleeping overnight in 
that area; and using any sleeping equipment in the controlled area for the 
purpose of sleeping overnight in that area.  
 
While the latter are aimed at a certain type of obstructive or disruptive 
activism – occupation or camping out (such as the long-term peace camp 
of the original target of the 2005 restriction, Brian Haw)29 – it is hard to 
conceive how restricting use of loudspeakers or loudhailers would not bite 
on protests more generally anywhere. This must be especially so on 
Parliament Square given the traffic noise. The seemingly neutral scheme 																																																								
27 Policing practice indicates there might be issues over legal certainty – as to render any restrictions not 
prescribed by law. There were reports of them confiscating pizza boxes on the ground that these 
constituted, or were capable of constituting, “sleeping equipment”: F Perraudin, “Occupy protesters forced 
to hand over pizza boxes and tarpaulin” The Guardian 24 October 2014  
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/occupy-protesters-forced-to-hand-over-pizza-boxes-
and-tarpaulin (access on 19 December 2017). 
28 Mead n24, 149 fn 156. 
29 As well as, as an aside, criminalising homelessness. 
still prioritises commercial activities, and discriminates those exercising 
their rights of free speech: we can probably presume that those using the 
chimes on ice cream vans around Westminster Square to attract custom, 
or those leading tour groups using microphones to amplify their voices are 
not directed to desist (s.143(1)). 30  The new provisions have been the 
subject of unsuccessful challenge. In Gallastegui, the claimant argued, in 
part, that the ban on overnight sleeping created an effective ban on her 
ability to conduct a long-term protest given that she lived 70 or so miles 
away.31 The return daily travel costs were prohibitive. This, alongside all 
other aspects of her claim, fell on stony ground. The statutory scheme in 
s.143 et seq did not constitute a disproportionate interference with rights 
under Articles 10 and 11.32  
 
Lastly, we should note one further significant statutory change that acts 
as a constraint on political protest. This is the introduction of Public 
Space Protection Orders (PSPOs) in s.59 of the Anti-social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014.33 This entitles local councils to make PSPOs 
to prevent or reduce unreasonable activities that are of a persistent or of 
a continuing nature, and which either have had or are likely to have a 
detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality. The 
																																																								
30 This is a point I have made frequently: we do not ban the queue outside Selfridge’s for the first day of the 
sale, yet we ban protest marches or impose conditions on them: Mead n24, 417. 
31 R (oao Gallastegui) v Westminster City Council and Others [2012] EWHC 1123 Admin though this was not a 
point pursued in the Court of Appeal [2013] EWCA Civ 28. 
32 See too the unsuccessful judicial review to challenge the decision of the Greater London Authority to 
erect and maintain fencing on and around Parliament Square Gardens, on grounds that it constituted a 
disproportionate interference with the rights in Articles 10 and 11: R (oao Barda) v Mayor of London [2015] 
EWHC 3584 Admin, the Occupy Democracy case. 
33 On which see generally K Brown “The hyper-regulation of public space: the use and abuse of Public Spaces 
Protection Orders in England and Wales” (2017) 37 LS 543, and more generally 
http://www.manifestoclub.com/ (access on 19 December 2017). 
potential for local councils to abuse and misuse this expansively, and 
uncertainly, defined power are obvious, for ordinary citizens and more 
sharply for those seeking to persuade others or simply to make public 
their opposition. Controversially, in October 2017, Ealing Council in London 
imposed a PSPO around an abortion clinic 34 , and plans for a similar 
response in Portsmouth were floated.35 Using PSPOs to outlaw the use of 
amplified speakers – proposed for example by Birmingham in July 2015 – 
obviously has repercussions for the exercise of the rights to free speech 
and to protest. 36  More widely, the powers have been criticised as a 
crackdown on homelessness, begging and those on the margins.37  
 
The fact that Parliament has produced what at best are marginal gains 
for those seeking socio-economic or political change through protests 
and other similar forms of mobilisation of course tells us only some of the 
story. The past eight years have been notable for significantly greater 
judicial engagement, and at a higher level than at any previous time, in the 
creation of “protest law”. Until the early 2000s, protest cases that reached 
the appellate courts were scarce and far between, with Brutus v Cozens38 
in 1973 on s.5 of the POA 1986 and DPP v Jones and Lloyd in 1999 on 
																																																								
34 BBC News “Ealing abortion clinic protest ban approved” 11 October 2017 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-41577129 (access on 19 December 2017). 
35 BBC News “Buffer zone plan for Portsmouth abortion clinic” 14 November 2017 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-41990010 (access on 19 December 2017). 
36 Liberty press release “A shameful restriction on protest rights - Liberty urges Birmingham City Council to 
scrap PSPO plans” 21 July 2015  https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-
statements/shameful-restriction-protest-rights-liberty-urges-birmingham-city (access on 19 December 
2017). 
37 See B Garrett “PSPOs: the new control orders threatening our public spaces” The Guardian 8 September 
2015  https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/sep/08/pspos-new-control-orders-public-spaces-asbos-
freedoms (access on 19 December 2017). 
38 [1973] AC 854. 
trespassory assembly two of few in recent memory.39 Indeed chapters on 
freedom of assembly or on protest in textbooks could be written 
authoritatively drawing on the same handful or so of cases, many of them 
dating back to the 1930s, and even to the late Victorian age.  
 
The few years before the coalition came to power in 2010 brought us a 
steadier and more regular stream of House of Lords/Supreme Court 
cases: Laporte40 and Austin41, both on breach of the peace, Kay v MPC on 
the power in s.11 POA 1986 to regulate processions,42 alongside R v 
Jones 43  and Gillan 44 , both involving protesters challenging more 
mainstream policing powers or substantive criminal law. The period since 
2010 has seen no abatement. The following provides a flavour of the 
docket book, of both the UKSC and Court of Appeal. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, none of the five below is a decision in favour of the 
protester. That is not to say that each, singly and collectively, is 
regressive. Findings in some provide positive glimmers of hope for protest 
law more widely. Together though, they though continue the historical 
norm favouring the state – or targets of protest – at the expense of 
those who resist or oppose.  
 
In Richardson, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for aggravated 
trespass (under s.68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 
1994) of an Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) activist who had locked-																																																								
39 [1999] 2 AC 240. 
40 R (oao Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55. 
41 Austin v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5. 
42 Kay v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2008] UKHL 69. 
43 R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16. 
44 R (oao Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 6.	
on in a shop run by a subsidiary of an Israeli company operating out of the 
West Bank, within the OPT. In broad terms, aggravated trespass is made 
out where X, while trespassing on land, does anything there with the 
intention of obstructing or disrupting Y’s lawful activities on that (or 
adjoining) land, or intimidating Y so as to deter her. The shop sold beauty 
products labelled "Made by Dead Sea Laboratories Ltd, Dead Sea, Israel". 
In the Supreme Court’s view, R was unable to avail himself of the 
argument that the activity he obstructed was not a lawful one, something 
that would have provided him with a defence to the charge. That was 
limited to acts or events that were "integral" to the occupant's activity on 
the land in question, not offences that	were merely incidental or collateral 
such as (it was submitted here) cheating the Inland Revenue by falsely 
claiming the benefit of favourable terms reserved for goods properly 
deriving from Israel (as distinct from those produced in the OPT). That 
could not render their subsequent sale in the shop unlawful. At most, it 
meant that the shop was liable to repay the Revenue any duty which ought 
to have been paid but was not. The offence of aggravated trespass has 
been criticised rightly on various grounds – its uncertainty, its width, and 
the need for only a limited connection in time or place between the 
protest and the complained-about activity 45 , and thus the extra bite 
offered to the adjunct power in s.69 to give directions. Richardson simply 
expands the state’s armoury by expanding the reach of the criminal law on 
peaceful, albeit disruptive, secondary direction action. While there might 
be echoes here of ban on secondary industrial action in s.224 of TULRCA 
1992, there are very clear real differences. First, not only does Richardson 																																																								
45 See Winder v DPP (1996) 160 JP 713 DC, discussed Mead, n21, 260-261. 
not have the imprimatur of Parliament, there is no clear or necessary 
adjuration on the face of s.68 for the interpretation adopted by the Court. 
It is very much a policy-oriented decision. Secondly, unlawful secondary 
industrial action does not expose trade unionists to prison. Thirdly, the 
nexus between protester, company and grievance seems closer in 
Richardson than in many secondary industrial disputes. The protesters’ 
alleged claims that the shop had committed various crimes was never 
tested because they were not proximate enough. In essence, the 
protesters’ claims were that the shop sales were a sine qua non of the 
continued production of beauty products and thus the continued existence 
of an economically viable but unlawful occupation by Israel. 
 
Two protest cases from Northern Ireland have made their way to the 
Supreme Court. In JR38, a majority held that there was no violation of 
Article 8 where the police had released CCTV footage of a 14 year-old 
boy to local newspapers showing him committing public order offences 
during sectarian disorder. 46  The police aimed to enlist public help in 
identifying him. The Court divided on whether or not Article 8 was even 
engaged, with only Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson holding that it was. In their 
view, the reasonable expectation test was contextual and account was 
needed of age, risk of stigma, consent and the use to which the material 
would be put. The Court was unanimous that, if Article 8 were engaged, 
publication was a proportionate response and thus a justified restriction 
on the right of privacy. In DB v Chief Constable of PSNI, the Court 
concluded that in 2012 the police had misconstrued their legal powers to 																																																								
46 Re JR38’s application for judicial review [2015] UKSC 42: Lord Clarke, Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge; Lord Kerr 
and Lord Wilson dissenting. 
stop parades passing through or adjacent to the nationalist Short Strand 
area of Belfast, the so-called flags protests.47 The police had determined 
they had no power to prevent parades that had not been notified to the 
Parades Commission, a requirement imposed on the proposed organiser 
by s.6(1) of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998. The Court 
determined that, since it was an offence under s.6(7) for both organisers 
and participants knowingly to organise or take part in an unnotified 
procession48, then the police had not simply the power, but by virtue of 
s.32 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, the duty to prevent any 
unnotified march, such being in the Court’s view, crimes. I have offered 
views on the case elsewhere.49 Simply put, the Court decision fails to 
accord any relevance to the fact that it is only a crime “knowingly” to take 
part in such a march. A blanket halting of a march is exactly that: no one 
can take part, whereas only those who should be arrested are those who 
knowingly take part in an unnotified march. Everyone is tainted with the 
guilt of everyone else, and an individualised right to protest is no longer 
that – protesters can be deprived of rights vicariously for the wrongdoing 
of another. It flies in the face of much Strasbourg jurisprudence including, 
interestingly, a case decided less than a week later, Lashmankin v 
Russia.50 There the European Court of Human Rights, in finding against 
Russia, said this: 
																																																								
47 [2017] UKSC 7. 
48 The position in Northern Ireland is different to that in England and Wales where it is an offence only for 
organisers, under s.11(7) of the POA 1986. 
49 D Mead “Flagging up a misconception” Protest Matters blog 2 February 2017 
https://protestmatters.wordpress.com/2017/02/02/flagging-up-a-misconception/ (access on 19 December 
2017). 
50 App. no 57818/09, Judgment 7 February 2017. 
 [The] enforcement of rules governing public assemblies, 
although important, cannot become an end in itself. In 
particular, where demonstrators do not engage in acts of 
violence it is important for the public authorities to show a 
certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the 
freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the 
Convention is not to be deprived of all substance … The Court 
considers that the authorities could have attained their goals 
by allowing the applicants to complete their protest and 
perhaps imposing a reasonable fine on the spot or later on.51 
It is very hard to see DB surviving Strasbourg scrutiny should the case be 
taken there. 
 
The last two cases that make up the recent run in the Supreme Court are 
Catt and Hicks, which we shall come to momentarily when we consider 
policing practice. 52  In both of those, again, the applicants were not 
successful. While all those Supreme Court were decided in favour of the 
police, we should not rush to conclude that is true of all court decisions in 
the past decade. Mengesha, discussed below, provides a curtailment of 
the common law power to take action to prevent breaches of the peace.53 
In the autumn of 2017, two peace campaigners were acquitted of criminal 
damage at a site owned by defence company BAE Systems after arguing 
they acted for the greater good.54 They said they were trying to stop 
																																																								
51 At para 462 
52 R (oao Catt) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2015] UKSC 9. 
53 R (oao Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] UKSC 9. 
54 BBC News “'Greater good' pair cleared of BAE criminal damage” 26 October 2017  
  http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-lancashire-41763568 (access on 19 December 2017). 
Tornado jets being used by Saudi Arabia to bomb Yemen. A district judge 
in Burnley accepted their beliefs were sincerely held and found them not 
guilty. In December 2017, magistrates found an anti-fracking campaigner 
not guilty of obstructing the police at a shale gas site near Blackpool.55 
Lastly, and in passing, we should note the potential for one measure 
propounded by the CPS to re-orientate the criminal justice system, at a 
formal level at least, in favour of protesters. In March 2012, the DPP 
introduced new guidance for prosecutors in public protest cases which 
included for the first time exacerbating and mitigating public interest 
factors that would militate against prosecution.56 The latter were: was the 
public protest essentially peaceful?; did the suspect have no more than a 
minor role?; did the suspect have no previous relevant history of offending 
at public protests or in general?; was the act committed minor?; and was 
the act committed instinctive and in the heat of the moment? 
 
 
Policing Practice 
 
The major epistemological breakthrough in legal scholarship over the last 
thirty or so years has been the recognition of the limits of the law, as 
either a regulator of social relationships or as predictor of behaviour. In 
this, scholars of protest law have benefitted enormously from insights 
gleaned from policing scholars. 																																																								
55 Drill or Drop News “Businessman considers legal action against police after acquittal for obstruction at 
anti-fracking protest” 19 December 2017, https://drillordrop.com/2017/12/19/businessman-considers-
legal-action-against-police-after-acquittal-for-obstruction-at-anti-fracking-protest/ (access 19 December 
2017). 
56  CPS Legal Guidance: Public Protests available here  http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_protests/ 
(access on 19 December 2017).	
 Drawing on examples from, and in the context of, the USA, Alex Vitale 
offers us a fifty-year typography of four models of protest policing: 
escalated force, negotiated management, the Miami model, and command 
and control. 57  There are certainly elements of many of these four in 
policing practice in the UK since 2010, but as instructive is a fifth, offered 
Patrick Gillham, Bob Edwards and John Noakes, what they term “strategic 
incapacitation”. 58  The predicate of this is preventing citizens from 
committing crime and causing disruption or disorder, with an emphasis on 
the control of space, and on surveillance and information sharing. It has 
two limbs, what we might term pre-crime policing and panoptical policing. 
 The preventive turn in criminal justice policy is now widely accepted, 
albeit that it remains contested.59 Its application to policing is no different. 
Pre-emptive, pre-crime policing is typified by indiscriminate and large-
scale arrests, using wide discretionary powers, followed by release without 
charge. It is designed either to intimidate and to chill, or simply 
incapacitate – or both. The police have been aided in this by the way in 
which protest has been securitised – the framing of social or political 
problems through a (national) security or counter-terrorism lens, thus to 
legitimise even more controls and constraints or to enhance the priority its 
control and constraint is given. Most notable here has been the use of 
																																																								
57 A Vitale “From Negotiated Management to Command and Control: How the New York Police Department 
Polices Protests” (2005) 15(3) Policing and Society, 283. The fours are typified by, in turn,: force meeting 
force, in the 1960s; cooperation, communication, tolerating disruption and  limited force; aggressive 
dispersal;  and inflexible, zero tolerance policing based on “hierarchical micro-management of protests”. 
58 P Gillham, B Edwards and J Noakes “Strategic incapacitation and the policing of Occupy Wall Street 
protests in New York City, 2011” (2013) 23 Policing and Society 81. 
59 H Carvalho, The Preventive Turn in Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2017), P Lawrence “The 
Vagrancy Act 1824 and the Persistence of Pre-emptive Policing in England since 1750” (2017) 57 Brit J Crim 
513.  
counter-terrorism arrest, detention and questioning powers – as occurred 
in Gillan, for example60 or to which the sister of the journalist Owen Jones 
was subjected61 – or the labelling by police of political activists as “non-
violent extremist” or “domestic extremist” and thus subjecting them to 
surveillance and other measures under the Government’s anti-
radicalisation agenda.62  
 
The eight-year period is full of examples of that preventive turn. In 
November 2011, officers from the Metropolitan Police arrested over 150 
EDL supporters to prevent a breach of the peace. The indications were 
that the group had planned to attack the Occupy LSX camp near St Paul’s 
cathedral.63 In December 2014, 76 were arrested at a die-in being staged 
in the Westfield shopping centre to signify support for Eric Garner, a black 
man who died during an arrest in the US earlier that summer.64 While not 
technically pre-crime policing, the arrests of 145 UK Uncut activists 
following a temporary sit-in and protest in Fortnum and Masons in March 
2011, on the day of the TUC day of action, also illuminate. A few were 
released without charge the following, leaving 138 charged with 
																																																								
60 Gillan n? 
61 O Jones “If my sister can be drawn into the anti-terror net, imagine the risk to others” The Guardian 26 
October 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/26/schedule-7-terrorism-act-2000-
activism-civil-rights-ethnic-minorities (access on 19 December 2017).	
62 See as just one example of many on the Netpol News webpage “Counter-terror police contact parents of 
Birmingham student protester over alleged ‘domestic extremism” 15 July 2014 
https://netpol.org/2014/07/15/prevent-birmingham-student-protest/ (access on 19 December 2017).  See 
more widely https://netpol.org/campaigns/together-against-prevent/ 
63 S Laville “Police arrest EDL supporters 'to prevent breach of peace'” The Guardian 11 November 2011 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/nov/11/police-arrest-edl-supporters-peace (access on 19 
December 2017). 
64 BBC News “Eric Garner death: 76 arrested at London Westfield demo” 11 December 2014 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-30424338 (access on 19 December 2017). 
trespassory assembly. By July, charges against all bar about 30 had been 
dropped.65 
One pre-crime policing incident that made its way up and through the 
courts is Hicks, arising from the Royal Wedding protests in April 2011. The 
Met arrested about 75 people in and around London either on the day or 
the night before the wedding on the basis that the police reasonably 
believed it was necessary to prevent an imminent breach of the peace.66 
Some were participating in the Right Royal Orgy in Soho Square, some 
arrested after they were found to have climbing equipment and anti-
monarchy placards, and 21 were arrested during raids of five squats in 
London the previous day.	One of them was planning to behead an effigy of 
Prince Andrew with a theatrical guillotine in a piece of street theatre, while 
four were dressed as zombies (with one wearing a "marry me instead" T-
shirt). All were released without charge once the wedding was over and 
the police considered the risk of a breach of the peace had been passed. 
Their period of custody ranged from two-and-a-half to five-and-a-half 
hours. Four brought test cases, on behalf of 15 others, alleging that the 
arrests were unlawful, constituting a violation of Art 5 of the ECHR. The 
applicants lost in all three courts – the Administrative Court, the Court of 
Appeal, and the Supreme Court – though not on the same basis. The 
Supreme Court held that Art 5(1)(b) did not cover arrests such as these, a 
general obligation not to commit a breach of the peace not being “an 
obligation prescribed by law”, but did hold that arrest and detention for 																																																								
65 S Malik “Fortnum & Mason protest: CPS drops charges against 109 UK Uncut activists” The Guardian 18 
July 2011 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jul/18/fortnum-mason-uk-uncut-charges-dropped 
(access on 19 December 2017). 
66 R Booth, S Laville and S Malik “Royal wedding: police criticised for pre-emptive strikes against protesters” 
The Guardian 29 April 2011 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/29/royal-wedding-police-criticised-
protesters (access on 19 December 2017). 
preventive purposes followed by early release came within Art 5(1)(c).67 In 
doing so, the Court specifically adopted the minority view of the 
Strasbourg Chamber in the Ostendorf case.68 There are concerns here. 
First, those involved in Hicks had no previous convictions (or none for 20 
years), no record of trouble, and no (recent) adverse interactions with 
police. Secondly, Ostendorf involved football fans not protesters so that, 
as a consequence, the exercise of other protected Convention rights was 
not in issue. Hicks is thus a very acontextualised decision, something that 
is all the more striking if compared with another of the Supreme Court’s 
recent Art 5 cases a month before, Serdar Mohammed, arising from the 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a very expansive and 
contextualised decision.69  
  
Combining mass arrests with the imposition of police bail makes a heady 
and invasive brew. That has been a matter of considerable contention 
among activists. The police have the power to impose pre-charge bail 
where there is insufficient evidence to charge, with suspects released 
pending further investigation. Where bail is imposed under s.37(2) of PACE 
1984 (rather than under s.34), conditions can be imposed. Only from April 
2017, has there been a time limit – 28 days – for police bail.70 Previously 
it could be in place indefinitely. In 2012, 182 cyclists arrested on the 
London Critical Mass on the night before the Olympics opening ceremony 
were subject to bail conditions including a requirement not to cycle 
anywhere in the borough of Newham, and not to go within 100m of any 																																																								
67 Hicks n?. 
68 Ostendorf v Germany [2013] ECHR 197. 
69 Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2. 
70 Section 62 of the Police and Crime Act 2017. 
Olympic venue, placing significant restrictions on work, movement and 
family life.71 Figures obtained by The Guardian in 2014 indicated that at 
least 732 people had been banned by police forces in England and Wales 
since 2008, but then never charged, 85% of those barred from protesting 
when bailed.72 Netpol, the network for policing monitoring, reports how 
many of those bailed have had specific conditions banning them from 
associating with other named persons, or with more than four others, and 
even bans on participating in future protests. Some conditions have been 
as wide, and as vague, as bans on entering “central London”.73 
  
Another tool in the armoury since 2014 has been the power to order 
protesters, and others, to disperse contained in s.35 of the Anti-social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.74 This too has been subject to 
considerable criticism, that it has been both misused and overused.75	A 
constable in uniform may direct any person in a public place in the locality 																																																								
71 S Malik “Critical Mass arrests: police charge three” The Guardian 29 July 2012 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/29/critical-mass-police-arrest-three (access on 19 December 
2017). 
72 K Rawlinson “Revealed: Police using pre-charge bail to muzzle protesters” The Guardian 25 December 
2014 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/25/revlealed-police-using-pre-charge-bail-muzzle-
protesters (access on 19 December 2017). 
73Netpol “Netpol calls for abolition of police bail conditions for protest arrests” 22 July 2014 
 https://netpol.org/2014/07/22/abolish-police-bail/#more-2339 (access on 19 December 2017). 
74 It requires an inspector (or higher rank) previously to have authorised the use of the s.35 power in a 
specified locality, under s.34. They might do so only if satisfied on reasonable grounds that the use of that 
power might be necessary for the purpose of removing or reducing the likelihood of (a) members of the 
public in the locality being harassed, alarmed or distressed, or (b) the occurrence in the locality of crime or 
disorder. In deciding whether to give such an authorisation an officer must have particular regard to Arts 10 
and 11. 
75 Football fans have also complained about their subjection to police dispersal powers. These powers 
operate alongside and in addition to that were ASBOs (anti-social behaviour orders) and since 2014 CBOs 
(criminal behaviour orders), themselves with a long pedigree of constraining protesters: see Mead n24, 362-
364, and more recently ASBOS imposed on anti-Olympics protesters in 2012: P Walker “Protester receives 
Olympics asbo” The Guardian 17 April 2012 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/apr/17/protester-
receives-olympic-asbo (access on 19 December 2017) and on members of the EDL in 2010 restricting their 
access to Birmingham until 2020: BBC News “Travel ban for English Defence League Birmingham men” 17 
December 2010 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-12024824 (access on 19 December 2017). 
specified in the authorisation to leave and not to return (for up to 48 
hours) if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person’s 
behaviour has contributed or is likely to contribute to either (a) members 
of the public in the locality being harassed, alarmed or distressed, or (b) 
the occurrence in the locality of crime or disorder. The officer must also 
consider that giving a direction is necessary for the purpose of removing 
or reducing the likelihood of harassment, alarm or distress, or of crime or 
disorder. Netpol reported how Merseyside Police imposed a dispersal 
order against anti-fur activists in Liverpool city centre – despite the fact 
that they were not even protesting at the time – and  against a peaceful 
anti-fascist counter-demonstration opposing a National Front ‘day of 
action’, even though the far right group failed to show up.76 Again, there is 
evidence of considerable overreach, and – as with many aspects of 
protest policing – formulaic recantation of limited reasons. A group who 
had been evicted from an anti-fracking site in Cheshire were ordered to 
disperse from an area covering not simply the former site but a five 
square mile area around it. The written notice indicated as the reason for 
the order was “protest site”, indicating the false conflation of protest with 
harassment, alarm or distress.77 There have been challenges – based on 
the paucity of reasoning78 or because it seems the police have simply 
imposed them en masse without consideration of individual culpability.79 
These latter resemble the challenges to football banning orders (FBOs) in 																																																								
76 Netpol “New dispersal order powers used against Southwark housing campaigners” 19 February 2015 
 https://netpol.org/2015/02/19/dispersal-orders-aylesbury-estate/ (access on 19 December 2017). 
77 Netpol “Cheshire Police issue restrictive dispersal orders to Upton anti-fracking protesters” 15 January 
2016  https://netpol.org/2016/01/15/section-35-upton-fracking-camp/ (access on 19 December 2017). 
78 Ibid 
79 Football Supporters’ Federation “Wrexham fans challenge new police powers… and win” 18 January 2017 
http://www.fsf.org.uk/blog/view/wrexham-fans-challenge-new-police-power-and-win-legal-precedent 
(access on 19 December 2017). 
the case of Gough, where the Court of Appeal made it clear that 
proportionate police decision-making action required that restrictions be 
imposed only after giving individual consideration to each affected 
person.80 
 
We see this too in the continued reliance on containment, or kettling, 
another feature of the policing of protest that has continued over the past 
decade. Largely, this has been because of the judicial approval offered to 
the practice by both the courts in the UK, and at Strasbourg, in Austin. 
There, in 2012, the Grand Chamber broadly followed the House of Lords, 
holding that kettling did not generally engage the right not to be deprived 
of liberty in Article 5. The Court did not rule that it never could but 
provided no indicia of how we might tell, so that on the facts, being 
confined in small area on Oxford Street, for several hours, during the May 
Day protests in 2001 did not constitute a deprivation of liberty. That being 
so, there was no need for the police to justify the containment, under Arts 
5(1)(a) – (f), something that would have proved very difficult. The case has 
been subject to considerable criticism – largely for the acontextual nature 
of the decision, its deviation from previous Art 5 case law, and for the 
flaws in its reasoning by analogy81  – but it marks the boundary of legally 
acceptable coercive mass policing. Austin “edges us towards [what in the 
UK is the] hitherto unknown concept of an illegal gathering, dealing with 
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81 For a critique, M Hamilton “Guest Post on Austin and Others Grand Chamber Judgment on 'Kettling'” 23 
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Mead “When kettling comes to the boil before the Strasbourg Court: is it a deprivation of liberty to contain 
protesters en masse?” (2012) 71 CLJ 472. 
protesters en masse based on suspicions of a few”.82 That approach, 
misconceived as I consider it to be, garners support more recently in DB, 
as we saw above.83 
 
Rays of light have been rare. In 2013, the High Court held that the policing 
practice of demanding personal details, and filming protesters, as a 
condition of release from containment was not lawful. This is welcome. 
Moses LJ explained why.  
Containment is not permissible for some purpose other than 
to prevent a breach of the peace which is taking place or 
reasonably thought to be imminent. In particular, it is not 
permitted as a means of ensuring that the identification of 
those contained has been obtained by questioning and by 
filming. It is the limited and confined purpose for which 
containment may be imposed which reveals that containment 
for the purpose of obtaining identification is unlawful. 84 
Against that is weighed a case such as Wright, the first challenge before 
the domestic courts to the practice, imported from the US, of physically 
penning in protesters.85 Wright claimed damages for false imprisonment 
and assault for the 15-minute period he spent in a small area defined by 																																																								
82 D Mead “The Right To Protest Contained By Strasbourg: An Analysis of Austin v. UK & The Constitutional 
Pluralist Issues it Throws Up” UK Constitutional Law Association blog, 16 March 2012 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/03/16/david-mead-the-right-to-protest-contained-by-strasbourg-an-
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barriers and railings, having shouted “Shimon Peres is coming this way”, 
during his state visit to London. The High Court held that the police had 
made out their case, premised on preventing what they reasonable 
perceived was an imminent breach of the peace. Wright swings the 
pendulum considerably back in favour of the police. His Lordship had two 
concerns. Wright’s words would provoke others in his group to attack or 
approach Peres’ car,86 and a worry that the Israeli security team might 
“have responded with a greater degree of robustness than British police 
officers …to a hand in the pocket”.87 In short, Wright was penned in not as 
a result of anything he said or did, but out of a fear for the reaction of 
others, whether they be other protesters or agents of a third-party state. 
Neither is sufficient. None of the usual cases referred to in the judgment, 
dating back to the usual Victorian cases – Beatty v Gillbanks88 and Wise v 
Dunning89 – is really precedent for that first worry. Even if they were, they 
could surely be distinguished on the basis of lack of any inflammatory 
language – hence the relevance of Redmond-Bate, where the citizen was 
successful.90 Further, Jay J – despite asserting that he should avoid doing 
so – seems to have conflated two separate legal questions: the 
reasonableness of the police apprehension and the reasonableness of 
the protester’s actions, or words.91 
 
An equally, and likelier more, worrying trend both in the UK and globally 
over the past decade or so has been the increased use of surveillance 																																																								
86 Wright ibid [61]. 
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88 (1882) 9 QBD 308. 
89 (1902) 1 KB 162. 
90 [2000] HRLR 249. 
91 Ibid [66]. 
technology, and reliance on its product.92 There are various elements to 
this and subjecting activists to surveillance serves a variety of purposes. 
Most notably, this is where the change has been. Surveillance – whether 
by CCTV or ANPR, or open source monitoring of social media traffic, or 
more physical forms such as by FIT or undercover officers – is now no 
longer designed to obtain evidence for charge, or indeed prevention of 
identifiable activities. It is used now as much to chill protesters more 
generally, to deter, and to disrupt both activities and organisational 
capacity.  
  
In 2015, the Supreme Court (by a majority, Lord Toulson dissenting) 
sanctioned the gathering and retention of personal data as not violating 
the right of privacy contained in Art 8.93 John Catt, an 85 year-old peace 
campaigner, challenged the practice of taking photographs and recording 
other details of his attendance at political events and participation in 
activism directed against arms manufacturer EDO in Brighton.	 Some 
members of “Smash EDO” had previously committed  violent offences. 
The police overtly collected information from Smash EDO public 
demonstrations. Because Smash EDO had associations with violent crime, 
information was retained even where no crime had been committed. Catt 
made a subject access request under the Data Protection Act 1998 and 
discovered that what was then the NPOIU (National Public Order 
																																																								
92 This is not the place to discuss surveillance as process, on which see e.g. P Gill and M Phythian, 
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93 Catt n?. 
Intelligence Unit 94 ) held details of his appearance, his vehicle, 
demonstrations he had attended and other personal details, in 107 
separate records. The majority (Lord Sumption giving the leading 
judgment) held that taking such information and making such records did 
not constitute a disproportionate interference. His Lordship provided 
various reasons why the interference with private life was minor: the 
information was personal but not intimate or sensitive; the primary facts 
recorded had always been in the public domain, and it was known that the 
police recorded them; there was no stigma attached to the inclusion of his 
information in the database as part of reports primarily directed to the 
activities of other people; the material was usable and disclosable only for 
police purposes and in response to requests made by Mr Catt himself 
under the Data Protection Act; and the material was regularly reviewed for 
deletion according to rational and proportionate criteria contained in the 
publicly available Code of Conduct and Guidance. Furthermore, His 
Lordship continued, there were numerous proper policing purposes to 
which the retention of evidence of this kind made a significant 
contribution. The longer-term consequences of restricting the availability 
of this method of intelligence-gathering to the police would potentially be 
very serious, and the amount of labour required to excise information 
relating to persons such as Mr Catt from the database would be 
disproportionate. Lord Toulson could see no necessity justifying retention 
for many years after the event information about someone about whom 
the police had concluded that he was not known to have acted violently. It 
was hard to see how information retained concerning attendance at 																																																								
94 This became the Domestic Extremism Unit, and most recently the National Counter Terrorism Police 
Operations Centre. 
mainstream political protest events could ever be thought necessary and 
proportionate. The suggestion that it would be over-burdensome for the 
police to have to review information about individuals such as Mr Catt was 
not supported by the evidence, especially since the police already 
conducted regular reviews. 
  
The Supreme Court in Catt, and courts in other cases – such as Wood95 
– have taken a narrow view of what constitutes privacy and private life, 
generally subscribing to the view that what happens, and is observable, in 
public places cannot also be private information.96 This is a peculiarly 
locational conceptualisation of privacy, though by no means an 
uncommon one. For the Supreme Court in Catt it was what happened to 
that information once it was obtained that transformed it into an aspect of 
private life: “it is clear that the state’s systematic collection and storage in 
retrievable form even of public information about an individual is an 
interference with private life.” 97  This is problematic conceptually – if 
privacy is concerned with autonomy and dignity, as the House of Lords 
held in Campbell, then where that control is exercised is secondary, if not 
redundant98 – and practically. It means for example that police are able 
without even engaging a citizen’s rights to a private life (let alone justify 
any interference as proportionate) to conduct open source surveillance of 
social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. Brighton queer activist 
Beth Granter had a visit from Sussex police wishing to ask her some 
questions about a planned Pride beach BBQ – about which she knew 																																																								
95 Wood v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414. 
96 See generally Aston above n? and  also https://privacyinternational.org/node/1481 
97 Catt n?? [6] Lord Sumption. 
98 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. 
nothing until they arrived. Their information was based, it seems, on 
monitoring a general LGBQT Facebook page with which she had had 
some previous involvement. 99  Not only does this engage, and have a 
significant and detrimental impact an on individual’s privacy, Val Aston 
also suggests – and backs this up with convincing empirical data from 
activists – that surveillance has  
a decisive impact on the capacity and capability of protest 
groups to achieve successful mobilisations… [undermining] 
some of [their] key building blocks…: i) the perceived legitimacy 
of protest groups; ii) the mobilisation potential of protest 
groups; and iii) their access to resources.100 
 
The other major concern to have played out throughout the period has 
been the use of undercover officers embedded within activists’ groups and 
networks, many of them having developed relationships with women (in 
almost all cases) and had children with them.101 The issue first came to 
light in 2010 when the trial of environmental campaigners, accused of 
conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass at Ratcliffe-on-Soar Power 
Station, collapsed. The CPS withdrew the case once it became known 
that PC Mark Kennedy (known as Mark Stone) had not only infiltrated the 
group over a eight year period, but had acted as agent provocateur on 
several occasions. The CPS had not originally disclosed Kennedy’s 
involvement in the Ratcliffe action, nor that his identity, and testimony, was 																																																								
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101 See generally R Evans and P Lewis Undercover: the true story of Britain’s police force (Faber and Faber, 
2013). 
false. Many took the identities of deceased children. So far, it is known 
that at least 144 officers subjected over 1000 groups to monitoring and 
surveillance. 102  In 2015, the Home Secretary announced she was 
establishing an independent inquiry, under Sir Adrian Fulford, and now 
under Sir John Mitting.103 Its purpose is to  
investigate and report on undercover police operations 
conducted by English and Welsh police forces in England and 
Wales since 1968. The Inquiry will examine the contribution 
undercover policing has made to tackling crime, how it was and 
is supervised and regulated, and its effect on individuals 
involved – both police officers and others who came into 
contact with them.104 
Throughout 2016 and 2017, the Inquiry has been determining preliminary 
issues such as applications for anonymity, and determining the core 
participants. Undercover policing has also triggered its own litigation, in 
both common law and under the HRA, from the women tricked into forming 
relationships.105  In turn, this has led to satellite litigation, such as the 
challenges by the women to the Met’s NCND policy, Neither Claim Nor 
Deny, in relation to the officers, with the Met successfully arguing that the 																																																								
102 R Evans “Undercover police spied on more than 1,000 political groups in UK” The Guardian 27 July 2017 
 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/27/undercover-police-spied-on-more-than-1000-
political-groups-in-uk  access on 19 December 2017). 
103 The Inquiry’s website is here https://www.ucpi.org.uk/ 
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Scottish inquiry into spies having sex with female activists” The Herald 12 September 2017  
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/15529897.Inquiry_into_spies_having_sex_with_female_activists_wa
s_blocked_in_Scotland/ (access on 19 December 2019). Permission has been given to bring judicial review 
proceedings to challenge the refusal to extend the Inquiry to cover Scotland: C Marshall “Theresa May 
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(access on 19 December 2019). 
105 For more, see https://policespiesoutoflives.org.uk/law/ 
HRA cases should be heard in secret before the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal. Most recently, in August 2017, the Met wrote to one of the 
women, Helen Steel, demanding payment of £7000 costs after she 
withdrew the appeal in relation to one of those NCND challenges. Steel 
had been trying to force the Met to disclose that her former boyfriend, 
John Dines, had been an undercover officer.106 It also came to light that 
what is now the National Counter Terrorism Police Operations Centre had 
placed leading Green Party politicians under surveillance. Files show that 
the police had chronicled how the Green politicians, such as the party’s 
sole MP Caroline Lucas, the party’s candidate for Mayor of London, Sian 
Berry and one of the party’s London Assembly members, Jenny Jones, had 
been speaking out about issues such as government cuts, the far right, 
police violence, and the visit of the pope. None of these matched the 
more limited scope given to the unit’s activities by the then Met Police 
Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, in October 2013. Its focus would 
be on individuals who committed or planned “serious criminal activity 
motivated by a political or ideological viewpoint” and would usually 
exclude “low levels of civil disobedience such as civil trespass or minor 
obstruction”.107 
 
It is impossible to square this oftentimes routine surveillance of activists 
and politicians with what was a notable shift in the official policing 
position at the start of the decade. Senior officers, HMIC reports, and 																																																								
106 R Evans “Woman deceived by police spy refuses to pay Met legal bill” The Guardian 28 August 2017 
 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/28/woman-deceived-by-police-spy-refuses-to-pay-met-
legal-bill (access on 19 December 2019). 
107 R Evans and V Dodd “Police anti-extremism unit monitoring senior Green party figures” The Guardian 28 
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training manuals all came to recognise the duty to facilitate protest as a 
guiding principle in both planning and on-the-day operational decision 
making. In 2009, the first immediate recommendation in the HMIC report 
“Adapting to Protest” was that in planning future public order operations 
for protest, the police should “demonstrate explicit consideration of the 
facilitation of peaceful protest”,108 something recognised and developed 
in its follow-up report a year later “Adapting to Protest: Nurturing the 
British Model of Policing”. We see it too in the 2010 reworking of the 
ACPO Guidance “Keeping the Peace” which talks of the starting point for 
policing peaceful protest being the presumption in favour of facilitating 
peaceful assembly.109 It is certainly something that has made its way into 
the everyday discourse of senior officers, such as Gold and Silver 
Command. Merseyside police indicated in September 2015, in the context 
of plans by neo-Nazis to march, that there were “no grounds to make an 
application to ban the march. In accordance with the Human Rights Act 
1998, the force will facilitate peaceful protest.”110 Staffordshire police in 
August 2014, of direct action sit in against an arms manufacturer, similarly 
asserted they “had to carefully balance our role in facilitating peaceful 
protest against any unlawful impact on the wider community.”111  
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Whether this filters downwards to officers on the street is moot. In the 
policing context more widely, research has shown that the HRA has had 
limited effect on everyday, street level policing decisions. Instead, it simply 
provides a frame for ex post facto explanations and rationales – for 
giving an account, not for accountability.112 There is also the feeling of the 
police themselves being unsure the extent of their duty. It remains 
common to read or hear of the police talking about the duty to facilitate 
lawful protest, a very different – and much narrower concept – than 
peaceful protest. In the lead-in to the Labour Conference in Brighton in 
2017, Sussex police tweeted113 
 
As another example, in July 2015 Chief Inspector Gareth Parkin, after 
disturbances during anti-austerity protests, stressed that Greater 
Manchester Police was “committed to facilitating lawful protest”.114  
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Another of Vitale’s four typologies of policing styles was negotiated 
management.115  We can see evidence that the new duty to facilitate, 
reflecting the Strasbourg Court’s positive obligations jurisprudence in such 
cases as Plattform Ärtzte v Austria116, has gained traction in the UK over 
the past decade through the expansion in protest liaison officers/teams 
(PLOs). They can be seen in their distinctive blue tabards at most major 
events. The use made of what has been termed “strategic facilitation”117 
is underpinned by a new approach in the psychological theories of the 
crowd, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) developed first by 
Steve Reicher.118 PLTs clearly have considerable potential for maintaining 
public order, not for stemming trouble but for averting it – “no surprises 
policing” – but also bring disguised strategic advantages.119 Most notably, 
activist groups have expressed concern about the use of PLOs as part of 
the State’s data and intelligence gathering arm. There is evidence of 
former FIT officers (Forward Intelligence Team) retraining and being 
redeployed as PLOs, and indeed evidence from the police themselves of 
such use. Netpol reports how Chief Inspector Sonia Davis, head of the 
Police Liaison Teams (PLT) unit in the Metropolitan Police, gave evidence 
as a prosecution witness in the trial of Critical Mass cyclists arrested on 																																																								
115 There is also evidence of another of his models, the Miami model – depicted as excessive force in 
controlling and dispersing protesters: see e.g. Gilmore, Jackson and Monk Keep Moving! Report on the 
Policing of the Barton Moss Community Protection Camp, November 2013-April 2014 (2016) 26-29 available 
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116 (1991) 13 EHRR 204. 
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the evening of the Olympics opening ceremony. Under cross-examination, 
Davis admitted that PLTs gather information on protesters and had even 
been covertly deployed at previous Critical Mass rides to try to identify 
‘leaders’.120 This is alongside the PLO’s standard operating procedures 
which confirms they are “likely to generate high-quality intelligence from 
the discussions they are having with [protest] group members”.121 
 
Private Regulation 
 
The third significant change over the past decade or so has been the 
increased role played by what I have termed “privatised regulation”, where 
control is no longer in the hands of the state through arrest and 
prosecution, or through the exercise of administrative discretion in the 
POA 1986.122 It is now well documented that private companies – actual 
or potential targets of protesters – undertake surveillance of activist 
groups by using corporate intelligences firms. In late 2017, The Guardian 
and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that leaked 
documents revealed British Airways, the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Porsche among five large companies identified as having paid corporate 
intelligence firms to monitor political groups that challenged their 
businesses. 123  Egregious as that is, that is not the limit to corporate 																																																								
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regulation of protest. We shall look at two, the continued reliance on 
private law remedies and the appearance of what has been termed ‘pay 
to protest’. 
 
Where the case reports once comprised injunctions granted in favour of 
Huntingdon Life Sciences, restraining animal rights activists, they now 
feature claims brought by fracking companies against environmental 
protesters. While many of these are civil claims for repossession of land 
– evicting protesters from a camp – some have been aimed at the form 
of action, rather than its location (accepting of course the blur between 
those two124). In September 2017, injunctions against “persons unkown” 
obtained by INEOS – a multinational petrochemical company – were 
challenged by two campaigners on the grounds they were overly broad, 
and thus overly restrictive of free speech and protest, and created too 
great a chill.125 They did not succeed.126 One characteristic of privatised 
regulation, and this INEOS injunction is no different, is that it exposes 
protesters to prison, for contempt, for conduct that would not otherwise 
lead to arrest and prosecution. The INEOS injunction for example banned 
the obstruction of free passage along a highway with the intention of 
obstructing, impeding or interfering with the lawful activities of the 
company or its agents,127 of potentially wider scope than the offence of 
wilful and unreasonable obstruction of the highway contrary to s.137 of 
																																																								
124 Tabernacle v Ministry of Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 23. 
125 R Evans “Campaigners challenge injunction against anti-fracking protesters” The Guardian 12 September 
2017 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/12/anti-fracking-campaigners-challenge-ineos-
injunction-joe-corre-joe-boyd (access on 19 December 2017). 
126 [2017] EWHC 2945 (Ch). 
127 Ineos-shale “Injunction” 23 November 2017  https://www.ineos.com/businesses/ineos-shale/injunction/ 
(access on 19 December 2017). 
the Highways Act 1980. There is also evidence that the chill goes wider 
than simply affecting actual or potential protesters. Some are drawn so 
broadly that they could conceivably capture those who offer support – 
food, water or medicine – for anyone protesting and, in the case of one, 
prevent legitimate reporting by restraining “persons unknown who intend to 
enter and/or to remain on the site in connection with the protest”. 128	
Whether these injunctions do properly restrict journalists is not the point; if 
they fear that they might do so, the chill is there.  
 
Another characteristic of certain types of injunction – those that restrain 
protests outside or near places of business – is that it privatises the 
control of public space. We see this with the INEOS injunction, but also 
with this one, granted in favour of Harvey Nichols against animal rights 
activists, protesting the shop’s return to selling fur. 129  By creating 
exclusion zones around the entrances to the seven stores across the UK, 
an otherwise perfectly lawful activity – simply being together on the 
pavement – is rendered subject to control, and incursions subject to 
penalty. The further ban on megaphones illustrates yet further the 
regulation – and criminalisation for violation – of otherwise lawful activity, 
that of being loud in public. Other SLAPP claims include “standard” ones 
for defamation, based usually on assertions made by activists and 
campaigners in a public forum of some sort. In May 2017, UK Oil and Gas 
Investments plc sent pre-action protocol letters to various members of 
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Keep Billingshurst Frack Free following comments made in the group’s 
newsletter including the sentence suggesting the planned works were 
completely ill-judged and “presumably the company thinks it can bully the 
regulators into giving them permission”.130  
  
There is another aspect to the increasing relevance of private (law) 
modes of control and repression that has reared its head in the past few 
years This is what has become known as “pay to protest”. In short, the 
police indicate in advance that they are unable or unwilling to provide a 
sufficient presence as to ensure the safety of protesters. If the organisers 
wish to proceed, they are told they must fund their own security. In 
February 2015, climate change protesters were told to hire a private firm 
to oversee a march – after the police indicated they would no longer 
facilitate the temporary closure of roads along the agreed route. The 
group, The Campaign Against Climate Change estimated the bill could run 
into thousands of pounds.131 This was not a one-off. At the same time, the 
Million Women March was told the same.132 Numbers are not known, and 
inevitably there will be groups that if told they will have to pay, will decide 
not to march or demonstrate. Litigation here is extremely unlikely, as are 
these policing decisions making the news, so it will all remain under the 
radar. In the end, public pressure and campaigning by Liberty reversed the 																																																								
130 Copy of solicitors’ letter seen by the author and on file. 
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decision in the scenario in point: Westminster City Council and Transport 
for London (TfL) confirmed they would arrange road closures to allow the 
climate change march to go ahead.133 I have discussed elsewhere some 
of the theoretical problems for human rights law that are thrown up by the 
imposition of a duty on organisers to pay to protest.134 Specifically, it 
removes the universality of the right – exercisable in such circumstances 
only by those who can afford to pay, not by all – and asks us to 
reconceptualise it as something based not on public and social utility – a 
right with a justifiable claim to instrumentality – but one founded on its 
intrinsic worth only to those individual participants. Such a reconfiguring, 
where rights project only private value, runs the risk of the right losing out 
in practical terms at the balancing stage, when the public interest is 
inveighed against it.135 
 
Access to Place and Space 
 
The last focus of this article is on the interplay between protest and 
place, a very fruitful topic for exploration. We considered above the 
changes to the regulatory regime around Parliament, and more widely by 
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PSPOs, but here we will consider the position of the Occupy movement 
that sprung up worldwide, in response to the austerity measures imposed 
to deal with the global financial crisis, such as Zuccotti Park in New York 
and Puerto del Sol in Madrid, as well as restrictions on civic space more 
generally.  
 
In the UK, the various occupations generated much case law, none of it 
successful from the protesters’ perspective. All, broadly, followed the 
same jurisprudential line – a recognition that the right to protest 
peacefully extended to occupations of land (that is, an occupation 
engages Article 11), but ultimately the protesters lost because the courts 
have taken the view that anything longer than a temporary incursion 
constitutes a disproportionate use. Thus the interference – the disbanding 
of the camp – was justified and necessary. The City of London authorities 
were granted a possession order by Lindblom J, confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal, in Samede in respect of the three-month long Occupy LSX camp 
outside St Paul’s.136 Various factors countervailed the protesters’ Art 11 
rights. The protest was itself a trespass, one that substantially interfered 
with a public right of way and with the rights of those who wished to 
worship in the Cathedral. It was in breach of planning control, and was 
causing a strain on public health facilities, and some damage to local 
businesses. The Court of Appeal took pains to distinguish the instant 
facts from those in Tabernacle, a once monthly weekend camp outside 
Aldermaston nuclear facility. 137  There, members of the public (and 																																																								
136 The Mayor Commonalty and Citizens of London v Samede [2012] EWHC 34 (QB) and [2012] EWCA Civ 
160. 
137 Tabernacle n? 
therefore, at least prima facie the protesters) had the right to pitch tents 
where the protest was camped, and it was neither a permanent nor a 
continuous presence. Further, there was no interference with any third-
party rights; the very object of their protest was on adjoining land owned 
by the same public landowner. Furthermore, the protest had continued for 
twenty years with no complaint. 138  The Court of Appeal in Samede 
summarised the case law and position as follows: 
while the protesters' Article 10 and 11 rights are undoubtedly 
engaged, it is very difficult to see how they could ever prevail 
against the will of the landowner, when they are continuously 
and exclusively occupying public land, breaching not just the 
owner's property rights and certain statutory provisions, but 
significantly interfering with the public and Convention rights of 
others, and causing other problems (connected with health, 
nuisance, and the like), particularly in circumstances where the 
occupation has already continued for months, and is likely to 
continue indefinitely.139 
We see similar sentiments and outcomes in the Democracy Village case 
(on Parliament Square in London140), the Grow Heathrow litigation141, and 
the Scottish Indycamp case, outside the Holyrood Parliament142 and the 
clearing of the Olympics site in 2012.143 Most recently, it filters through 																																																								
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INEOS v Persons Unknown, the anti-fracking injunction case decided in 
November 2017 that we touched on above.144 
 
We might just note a few problems of a more conceptual nature that the 
judicial approach in cases such as these evinces. The first is that in 
general the courts divorce the manner and form of the protest – here the 
place – from its essence, though not always so. The conclusion that this 
is not then a restriction on protest per se then naturally follows. There is 
now a wide and varied literature (including the ethnographical) on the 
constitutive nature of place for protest. Activists might (temporarily) 
reconstruct place to make their point, such as the planting of trees in the 
tarmac of the M41 extension in Shepherd’s Bush, in west London by 
Reclaim the Streets in 1996 to make evident the stark contrast between 
what was to come and what could have been,145 or might more actively 
become the site of direct and longer term resistance, such as the Pollok 
Free State during the extension of the M77 south of Glasgow in the mid 
1990s.146 As geographer Tim Cresswell put it, “the qualities of place that 
make them good strategic tools of power simultaneously make them ripe 
for resistance in highly visible and often outrageous ways.”147Tabernacle 
is one where the court did not take that analytical route.148 Secondly, we 
should treat with caution assumptions that prioritise the public highway as 
a place for passage, and perhaps as a place for commerce, what 
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Nicholas Blomley typifies as traffic logic, than as a place equally for civic 
participation and as sites of mutually contested expression.149 Thirdly, the 
cases – though no doubt a function of how the protesters’ cases are 
argued – underplay the organisational and mobilisational capacity that 
protest camps and occupations afford. 150  The Carpenter’s Estate in 
Newham was cleared for redevelopment (as part of the council’s post-
Olympics plans) but had lain empty. It was taken over by a group of single 
mothers (Focus E15) who had all been living in council hostels but were 
threatened with dispersal across the UK when Newham decided to close 
them as part of its post-2008 austerity package. The occupation was thus 
a form of resistance – to the group’s relocation – but also served to 
highlight the pan-London growth of gentrification.	 The occupation kick-
started wider activism by offering the opportunity for publicity and social 
engagement: “The occupied flats were opened to the public and ran as a 
social centre for two weeks, with an evolving program of daily events, 
including workshops, meetings, and music and comedy gigs.”151 We might 
think of them as what Paul Routledge termed “convergence spaces”, 
creating heterogeneous affinity between various social formation 152 , 
exposing participants to new, and different, ways of “doing politics”, such 
as the bottom-up Peoples’ Assembly at St Pauls. Lastly, the cases can be 
read as presuming that which evidently is not the case: the ready and free 
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availability of public land, not something that it is in diminishing supply, its 
scarcity rendering it yet more politically valuable. Indeed, many of the 
occupations contested that very fact. The transfer of land into private 
hands, for development, is one of the more significant, but less remarked 
upon, narratives of Western political discourse over the past couple of 
decades, perhaps none more so than in the UK. In February 2016, the 
author Will Self warned that the spiritual wellbeing of cities was being 
eroded by the creeping corporatisation and privatisation of its public 
spaces.153 The danger is not simply that the spaces are no longer public, 
but that they falsely offer the solace of being public – through design and 
feel.154 
 
Let us develop that point about diminution, by reflecting on civic space 
more widely a little more. While it is true that the UK has not been hit with 
the introduction of the sorts of law to have afflicted protesters and 
activists in Russia and India, to name but two – restrictions on NGOs and 
campaigning groups that receive foreign funding – we should be 
concerned at how the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning 
and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 plays out. This imposes 
significant restrictions on what can be spent in an election period by non-
parties, that is by groups who do not formally register with the Electoral 
Commission as a party under the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000. The annual UK-wide campaign limits were cut to 																																																								
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about 45% of their pre-2014 amounts, from £988,500 to £450,000.155 
Serious concerns were raised during the Bill’s passage about the affect 
on NGOs given the scope of the changed meaning of controlled 
expenditure in s.26(2)(b) and s.26(4)(c) of the 2014 Act: can it reasonably 
be regarded as intended to promote or procure electoral success at any 
relevant election of a party or candidate whether or not the conduct 
involves any express mention being made of the name of any party or 
candidate? That would, I would submit obviously, effect many political 
campaigning groups. Those worries were amplified in the absence of any 
evidence or data from the Government showing why the reductions were 
needed or what the effect might be of that changed definition of 
controlled expenditure. The Electoral Commission reported that in the 
2005 elections, only 24 third-parties reported any spending and none 
came close to the then maximum. In 2010, not a single third-party spent 
more than 70% of the statutory limit. In each of 2005 and 2010, only two 
third-parties exceeded what would be that new lower limit.156 There must 
therefore be question marks as to the proportionality of the new 
framework, given the arbitrary, evidence-free rationales. As the Political 
and Constitutional Reform Committee put it during passage of the Bill: 
We have stated already that we have not seen adequate 
evidence for setting the new thresholds for expenditure at the 
levels imposed by Part 2 of the Bill. The Government must 
explain the reasoning behind its decisions during the passage of 
																																																								
155 There were variations across the regions: from £793,500 in England to £319,800, from £108,000 in 
Scotland to £55,400, from £60,000 in Wales to £44,000 in Wales, and from £27, 000 in Northern Ireland to 
£30,800. 
156 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 7th Report of session 2013/14 “The 
Government's lobbying Bill - Volume I” HC 601-I, 19 September 2013, para 66 
the Bill. Even if the Government can make the case for 
imposing lower levels, it must be able to give a convincing 
account of why it has chosen these particular limits as opposed 
to any others. If it cannot do so, we recommend that the 
existing levels continue to apply until such point as the case for 
change has been made.157  
 
It must remain a worry that the Act will capture ordinary legitimate 
campaigning activities – or, as bad, that it will chill such activities, with 
groups erring on the side of caution. Alternatively, they might follow the 
line taken by Greenpeace, fined £30,000 for refusing to register as a 
“third-party campaigning organisation” in the run-up to the 2015 
election. 158  It will disproportionately disfavour campaigning on single 
issues where there is already a single-issue group such as, in recent 
times, the recently formed NHA party in the UK (since it captures the 
expenditure of groups aiming to persuade us to think favourably about 
topic X and thus about policy X and thus about party X). The risk is 
certainly greater for policy-only campaigning groups. The Government’s 
case was clear: it was important to get the big money out of politics, to 
prevent unregulated spending by vested interests having an undue 
influence on the outcome of elections. This required the threshold to be 
brought down, and disaggregated so it could not be spent 
disproportionately in small areas. Of course, there is an argument that the 
																																																								
157 Ibid, para 82. 
158 M Taylor “Greenpeace fined under Lobbying Act in 'act of civil disobedience'” The Guardian 18 April 2017  
 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/18/greenpeace-first-organisation-fined-lobbying-act 
(access on 19 December 2017). 
 
reduced sums will have little effect on the autonomy of third party groups 
to campaign and to seek to persuade. The rules have no bite outside an 
election period and, in any event, so few of them have previously spent 
anywhere near the new maximum. That may be so, but then another point 
arises. The symbolic shift that this heralds – combined with the national 
party limit of nearly £20m and (say) s.319 of the Communications Act 
2003, the ban on political advertising – is a preference for formal parties 
as the route to political change, and the vehicle for civic engagement 
rather than informal participation, through campaigning, protest, activism 
and opposition. That marks a significant change in policy. 
 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
In 2016, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association in his follow up report on the UK (three years 
after his first visit in 2013) noted his appreciation of the Government’s 
efforts to address some of his earlier recommendations. However, he 
continued, he was concerned  
 that a series of separate measures by the Government, some 
implemented and others proposed, have negatively impacted 
the exercise of the rights to freedom of association and 
freedom of peaceful assembly, and in general, are resulting in 
the closing of space for civil society. In many instances, these 
moves have been subtle and gradual, but they are as 
unmistakable as they are alarming… [and was] concerned that, 
put together, these measures suggest that the Government 
has a negative view of civil society as a critical partner that 
can and should hold it accountable.159 
This article has identified and tracked many of these. Of course, we 
should acknowledge the many, many successful protests that occur in the 
UK every year, whether large-scale and organised or an ad hoc action 
comprising just a handful.160 These have not been our concern, though 
they perhaps should have been: that many of us can enjoy undisturbed 
political participation tells us much. Law’s focus though is usually on the 
problematic, the contentious and the difficult. Of this, there is much, as we 
have seen. The UK is not alone in taking a more regressive path. The 
International Centre of Not-for-profit Law has created a US Protest Law 
Tracker, following initiatives at state and federal level since the election of 
President Trump in November 2016 that restrict the right to protest.161 So 
far (as at the end of November 2017) 27 states have considered 48 bills. 
Eight have been enacted, with 25 pending and 15 defeated. These include 
mandatory one-year suspensions for any student who is twice “found 
responsible for infringing on the expressive rights of others,” such as 
through a protest of a campus speaker (Illinois), empowering police to use 
“any means necessary” to break up public assemblies of ten or more that 
obstructed traffic (Indiana) and criminalising certain protest actions as 
economic terrorism (North Carolina). Globally, liberalising measures are 
harder to find.  																																																								
159 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful of association on his follow-up 
mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Human Rights Council, 35th session, 6-
23 June 2017 A/HRC/35/28/Add.1) 
160 Whether or not they are successful at effecting political change or in ways of thinking is beyond the 
confines of this article. 
161 http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ 
 Perhaps that expansion of legal regulation, and consequent diminishing of 
political space, has contributed to an expansion in forms of innovative 
transgression. 162  We might think of the Take a Knee protest, which 
originated in the NFL in the USA – kneeling during the National Anthem in 
protest at the treatment of fellow black citizens – and which has spread 
to European football (members of German team Hertha Berlin did so at a 
home game in October163) and the world of entertainment164 and been 
taken up by US army veterans.165 In Poland in 2016, opposition to the 
country’s abortion law was signified by a forest of coat hangers 
suspended from wires outside Parliament166, while in Paris, at the time of 
COP21 in November 2015, there was a state of emergency – following 
the Bataclan terrorist attack in the city a few days previously. This meant 
a city-wide ban on assemblies. This was no hindrance to those seeking to 
show their opposition to governmental inaction on climate change: rows 
and rows of shoes were left. 167  At its height, La Place de la Republique 
was decked with over 20,000 pairs. 168  Likewise, Spain in April 2015, 
																																																								
162 D McAdam, S Tarrow, and C Tilly Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7-8 
163 BBC news 14 October 2017,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/41623019 (access on 15 January 
2018). 
164 B Beaumont-Thomas “Pharrell Williams 'takes a knee' in Charlottesville protest '” The Guardian 25 
September 2017  https://www.theguardian.com/music/2017/sep/25/pharrell-williams-take-a-knee-
charlottesville-protest-nfl-donald-trump (access on 19 December 2017). 
165 CBS News “Sacramento vets take a knee to protest injustice at city council meeting” 4 October 2017  
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sacramento-vets-take-knee-protest-injustice-city-council-meeting/ 
(access 15 January 2015). 
166 NBC news 26 April 2016, “Abortion in Europe: ‘Coat Hanger Rebellion’ Grips Poland” 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-abortion-fight/abortion-europe-coat-hanger-rebellion-grips-
poland-n559621 (access on 15 January 2018). 
 
167 Indeed, thinking more reflexively, this might be another example of how the regulation of place creates a 
political response, as we saw with Mark Thomas earlier. 
168 CBC news 29 November 2015 “Shoes stand in silent protest at Paris climate conference” 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/climate-protest-paris-1.3342384 (access on 19 December 2017). 
following the passing of very restrictive laws banning protests in the 
vicinity of parliament, witnessed the world’s first hologram protest. 169 
 
What is also clear have been the opportunities – or “affordances”170 – 
that technology and social media now offer. One remarkable development 
over the past decade or so has been the explosion in on-line campaigning, 
through Facebook and Twitter hashtags such as #BlackLivesMatter and 
more recently #MeToo, in light of the sexual abuse scandals to have hit 
the entertainment industry and politics in 2017. In the UK, Stop Funding 
Hate formed as an on-line presence in the summer of 2016 “when a group 
of people came together online to express concern at the way certain 
newspapers were using hate and division to drive sales.”171 The group’s 
aim is to facilitate concerted public pressure as a means to persuade 
companies to cease taking out adverts in newspapers like The Daily Mail, 
The Express and The Sun. In late November, the stationery group 
Paperchase offered the following public apology for its Christmas 
wrapping paper promotion in The Daily Mail172:  
																																																								
169 Z D Boren “Spain's hologram protest: Thousands join virtual march in Madrid against new gag law” The 
Independent 12 April 2015  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/spains-hologram-protest-
thousands-join-virtual-march-in-madrid-against-new-gag-law-10170650.html (access on 19 December 
2017). 
170 On which see B Cammaerts “Technologies of self-mediation: affordances and constraints of social media 
for protest movements” in J Uldam and A Vestergaard (eds.) Civic Engagement and Social Media: Political 
Participation Beyond Protest (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
171 The group’s webpage is  https://stopfundinghate.org.uk/about-the-campaign/campaign-history/ (access 
on 7 December 2017). 
172 @FromPaperchase tweet 09:28, 20 November 2017 https://twitter.com/FromPaperchase (access on 19 
December 2017).	
 Social media also offers campaigners ample amplification. In the run-up to 
the General Election in 2017, Captain Ska released “Liar Liar”, including 
several clips of Theresa May’s speeches, with the chorus: “She’s a liar, 
liar, oh, she’s a liar. No you can’t trust her, no, no, no.” It received no airplay 
a result of regulatory impartiality guidelines but reached No1 in both 
Amazon’s listing for songs downloaded in Britain and the iTunes UK chart 
– prompting considerable media interest and exposure. As of early 
December 2017, it had been viewed over 3m times on YouTube. The 
capacity for on-line organisation and opposition should not be 
underplayed. In January 2018, the appointment of journalist/commentator 
and Free School founder Toby Young, to the Board of the new university 
regulator (the Office for Students) was surrounded in controversy, given 
many of his earlier expressed views (in social media and in print) on such 
matters as eugenics, disability and women. This in turn led to a Twitter 
campaign and on-line petition through Change.Org that garnered over 
220,000 signatures in a handful of days.173 He resigned after just a week 
in post. 
 
																																																								
173 https://www.change.org/p/theresa-may-mp-sack-toby-young-from-university-watchdog-post (access 15 
January 2018). 
Over the past decade, public support for the right to protest – that is, to 
hold demonstrations and marches – has remained stable. The latest 
British Social Attitudes Survey 2017 shows 87% support for organising 
public meetings to protest against the government and 73% support for 
organising protest marches and demonstrations. 174  Indeed, and 
remarkably, there has been an increase in support for those with extremist 
views having such rights: 50% (46% in 2006) saying those who want to 
overthrow the government by revolution should “definitely” or “probably” be 
allowed to hold public meetings to express their views, while 53% (50% in 
2006) hold the view that those who want to overthrow the government by 
revolution should “definitely” or “probably” be able to publish books 
expressing their views. This perhaps is the prism through which we should 
view the 2010 Coalition pledge to “restore rights to non-violent protest”,175 
designed to secure a little more protection for the mass, staged 
outpourings of grievances for resolution within and by that political system. 
The BSA data tells us nothing about public support for disruptive or 
obstructive, and more confrontational, forms of political activism. Such 
protests have become far more the mainstay in the UK over the past 
several years, especially – but not exclusively – as a means to oppose 
the expansion of fracking operations. It is high time for a national 
conversation focussing on the law and such forms of resistance. 
Furthermore, we can see why – however widely drawn it was drawn, and 
however peaceful the protesting activities it sought to protect – the 2010 
pledge was doomed to fail. The problem is not, and rarely is, “the law”. 																																																								
174 E Clery and D Mead British Social Attitudes 34: Civil Liberties p.10-12 up from 86% and down from 77% in 
2006 respectively. The report is available here http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-
attitudes-34/civil-liberties.aspx 
175 Above n2. 
Two examples make this clear. In November, The Guardian reported that 
the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (PIRC), which oversees 
police conduct in Scotland, upheld three complaints from the Scottish 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign (SPSC) after officers in Aberdeen visited 
one man at home to warn him off attending a rally, barred activists from 
entering a court and used an activists’ meeting to gather intelligence. The 
PIRC suggested that this risked breaching the activists’ human rights by 
interfering with their rights to peaceful protest and to privacy.176 Secondly, 
a recent report by Netpol ‘Protecting the Planet is Not a Crime’ highlighted 
the aggressive, zero-tolerance policing tactics towards any form of 
disruption – for example the tactic of “slow-walking’177 –adding that this 
not only criminalised large numbers of people, but backfired, escalating 
further civil disobedience rather than reducing it. Without attending to 
those structural imbalances of power between citizen and police, and 
between state and activist, and to those judicial assumptions of legitimacy 
and of the role of activism within a democracy – inherent in many 
judgments we considered – any proposed reforms will do no more than 
tinker at the edges. 
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November 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/13/scottish-police-thwarted-palestinian-
activists-right-to-protest-in-peace (access on 19 December 2017). 
177 The report is available here https://netpol.org/2017/11/20/report-launch-north-yorkshire/ p.7-8 
 
 
